Surveys of Recent Developments in New Jersey Law
In this survey section, the Seton Hall Law Review presents surveys of recent New Jersey cases of interest to practitioners. In so doing, the Law Review
hopes to assist the legal community in keeping abreast of interesting changes
in significant areas of practice.
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REAL PROPERTY -

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF RESTRICTIONS ON LAND
USE . ANALYSIS OF WHETHER STATE STATUTE RESTRICTING
SEXUALLY ORIENTED BUSINESS IS CONSTITUTIONAL IS NOT LIMITED TO
Township of Saddle Brook v. A.B. Family
Center, Inc., 156 N.J. 587, 722 A.2d 530 (1999).

MUNICIPAL BOUNDARIES

In September of 1995, A.B. Family Center sought permission
from the Township of Saddle Brook to operate an adult video store
within the Township's boundaries. See Township of Saddle Brook v. A.B.
Family Center, Inc., 156 N.J. 587, 589, 722 A.2d 530, 532 (1999). The
Family Center store was to sell and rent adult videos and "related
merchandise." The Township, however, refused to issue a certificate
of occupancy to the Family Center. The Township noted the Family
Center's non-compliance with the local zoning ordinances and
stressed three reasons for its denial of the certificate of occupancy:
(1) Family Center needed to obtain approval for its site plan, (2)
Family Center had not complied with the parking provisions of the
zoning ordinances, and (3) Family Center's proposal for signs was
unlawful and did not conform with the regulations of the zoning ordinance. See id. at 590, 722 A.2d at 532.
Notwithstanding its unsuccessful appeal to the Board of Adjustment, the Family Center opened its store, relying on a certificate of
occupancy from 1986. Despite the zoning officer's cease and desist
order, the Family Center continued operating its adult video store.
The Township then filed a complaint seeking to enjoin the Family
Center from operating its business in violation of the Township's ordinances. The Township later filed an amended complaint further
alleging that the Family Center's adult video store violated a NewJersey statute that prohibits a party from operating "a sexually oriented
business within 1000 feet of any place of public worship, any school
or school bus stop, any municipal or county playground or place of
public recreation, or any area zoned for residential use." Id. (citing
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:34-7 (West 1992)).
The Township also alleged that the Family Center violated its
Peace and Good Order ordinance. In January of 1996, the Township
adopted a Peace and Good Order ordinance that completely barred
all adult book and video stores from operating anywhere within the
Township boundaries. Thus, the Township further alleged that the
1670
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Family Center's adult video store violated the Township's newly
adopted ordinance.
The New Jersey Superior Court, Law Division, refuted all three
of the Township's allegations. See id. First, the court denied the
Township's request for injunctive relief premised upon alleged violations of the Township's ordinances. See id. The court determined
that the Township reinforced its site plan, parking, and sign requirements solely to prevent the Family Center from operating its
adult video store. See id. The law division then struck down the
Township's newly adopted Peace and Good Order ordinance, noting
that the Township had not demonstrated a compelling interest in
completely prohibiting sexually oriented businesses from operating
anywhere within the Township's boundaries. See id. Further, the
court noted that in adopting the Peace and Good Order ordinance,
the Township had failed to demonstrate that its complete prohibition
was the "least restrictive means for achieving the Township's objectives." See id. The court then addressed the constitutionality of the
New Jersey Statutes Annotated 2C:34-7 and heard testimony from the
Township's zoning officer, who stated that the Family Center's business could not operate anywhere within the Township without violating the statute. See id. at 591, 722 A.2d at 532. Thus, the law division
concluded that, as applied to the Township, the statute was unconstitutional because it left no area within the Township that would not
fall under the statute's boundary restrictions. See id.
The New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division affirmed the
law division's rulings as to the Township's zoning ordinances as well
as the Township's Peace and Good Order ordinance. See id. at 590,
722 A.2d at 532. The appellate division, however, rejected the law division's determination that section 2C:34-7, as applied to the Township, was unconstitutional. See id. at 591, 722 A.2d at 532. The appellate division noted that the validity of a state statute "should not be
determined on the basis of municipal boundaries." Id. The appellate division recognized that restrictions, such as the New Jersey statute, on protected speech could be deemed constitutional if areas
outside the Township's boundaries could serve as alternative channels of communication. See id. Because this argument had not been
presented initially, the appellate division remanded the matter to the
law division to -consider the availability of alternative locations at
which to establish a sexually oriented business outside of the Township's boundaries, but close to the Family Center's Saddle Brook location. See id. The appellate division then placed the burden of
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proving the existence of such alternative available sites on the Township. See id.
The NewJersey Supreme Court granted Family Center's petition
for certification but denied the Township's cross-petition for certification that sought to dispute the rejection of the Township's ordinances and Peace and Good Order ordinance. See id. at 591, 722
A.2d at 532. The court ultimately affirmed the appellate division's
judgment and remanded the matter to the law division. See id. at 598,
722 A.2d at 536.
Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Stein began by acknowledging the issue as one of first impression in New Jersey. See id. at
591, 722 A.2d at 532. Thejustice noted the court's concurrence with
the appellate division's conclusion that the validity of a state statute
should not depend solely upon municipal boundaries. See id. The
court instead looked to precedent to reconcile the differences between the state statutes and municipal ordinances and zoning
boundaries. See id. First, the court referred to a United States Supreme Court case that set forth the criteria for determining the constitutionality of restrictions on sexually oriented businesses. See id. at
591, 722 A.2d at 533 (citing City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475
U.S. 41 (1986)). Justice Stein explained that the City of Renton Court
validated the constitutionality of a city ordinance that prohibited the
operation of adult motion picture theaters within 1000 feet of any
residentially zoned area or dwelling, place of worship, or park, and
within one mile of any school. See id. at 591-92, 722 A.2d at 533.
Relevant to the case at bar, the justice noted that the ordinance in
City of Renton left approximately five percent of the city's land available for the operation of adult movie theaters - thereby providing
alternative avenues of communication. See id. at 592, 722 A.2d at 533.
Justice Stein then referred to Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim,
in which the Court struck down a municipal ordinance that
"prohibited all live entertainment, including nonobscene nude dancing, in the Borough's commercial zoning district." Id. (citing Schad v.
Borough of Mount Ephraim,452 U.S. 61, 66 (1981)). The justice noted
that the Schad Court rejected the argument that the ordinance was
valid because such live entertainment was available in areas outside of
the Borough's boundaries but in close proximity to the proposed
site. See id. at 593, 722 A.2d at 533. Justice Stein particularly noted
Justice Blackmum's concurrence in Schad, which expressed concern
regarding ordinances preventing citizens access to forms of protected
expression simply because they were available in areas outside of that
particular municipality and, thus, would not disturb the Borough's
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lifestyle. See id. at 593, 722 A.2d at 543 (citing Schad, 452 U.S. at 77-79
(BlackmumJ., concurring)).
Justice Stein next consulted several federal cases in which the
courts determined the validity of municipal ordinances on a regional,
rather than a municipal, basis. See id. at 594, 722 A.2d at 534. More
notably, the justice explained that in determining whether a court
should consider alternative locations for a protected activity as a
means for alternative channels of communication, federal courts
have focused on whether these other sites are feasible and whether
their higher costs, if any, have been set off. See id. The court further
noted that federal courts also have considered whether the alternative locations are "commensurate with the size of the relevant market." Id. at 595, 722 A.2d at 535.
After referring to precedent to guide the court through its case
of first impression, Justice Stein pronounced that section 2C:34-7
constitutes a statewide restriction on the location of sexually oriented
businesses. See id. at 596, 722 A.2d at 535. Accordingly, the justice
continued, the constitutionality of the statute as to the Township will
depend upon whether its application allows for "adequate alternative
channels of communication within the relevant market area." Id. at
597, 722 A.2d at 535. As such, the court concluded that upon remand, the law division must first determine the adequacy of alternative sites based upon surveys of the market area surrounding the
Family Center site. See id. The court noted that the market area
should include other municipalities within a reasonable proximity to
the Family Center's Saddle Brook location. See id. The court commented that in determining reasonable proximity, the trial court will
have to rely upon "regional marketing patterns, availability of public
transportation and access by automobiles, geographical distribution
of customers at comparable sexually oriented businesses," and other
Further, Justice Stein
relevant factors. Id., 722 A.2d at 536.
enounced that in determining the availability of feasible alternative
locations, the trial court must rely upon the zoning ordinances of
neighboring municipalities and whether the provisions "permit, prohibit, restrict, or affect the feasibility of establishing sexually oriented
businesses." Id.
Finally, the court pronounced that after surveying the relevant
market and available sites, the law division must ultimately determine
the constitutionality of section 2C:34-7. See id. In so doing, the justice explained, the law division must weigh the availability of alternative channels of communication against the size of the relevant market and determine whether the former "is adequate to sustain the
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constitutionality of section 2C:34-7 as applied to the Family Center
site." Id.
In conclusion, Justice Stein noted the court's concurrence with
the appellate division's allocation of the burden of proof. See id. at
597-98, 722 A.2d at 536. The justice explained that such an allocation is consistent with First Amendmentjurisprudence. See id. at 598,
722 A.2d at 536. The court further opined that the burden is rightfully placed upon the party seeking to restrict protected speech and
that in order to meet the burden, the party must demonstrate that its
restrictions are fairly tailored to its objectives, are the least intrusive
means to achieve those objectives, and allow for "adequate available
alternative avenues of communication." See id.
The New Jersey Supreme Court's analysis in the case at bar is
thorough; however, its decision may stretch the boundaries of First
Amendment jurisprudence. For example, the time may come when
there are no alternative channels of communication. If each municipality begins to deny operation of such sex-oriented businesses,
the court has pronounced that each may do so on the premise that a
neighboring town will permit the business. What, then, will happen
when the neighboring town decides no longer to permit these businesses to operate? At that point, what will triumph - the ability of a
municipality to alter its lifestyle or the right, according to free
speech, of individuals to operate sex-oriented businesses? Moreover,
although the court's instructions to the law division seem equitable, it
is bewildering to think that our state's highest court is permitting a
municipality to restrict free speech simply because a neighboring
borough permits the form of prohibited speech.
On the other hand, municipalities should and will continue to
be permitted to implement zoning ordinances in accordance with
the lifestyle that the town and its citizens choose to embody. In that
respect, the court has correctly re-affirmed a municipality's ability to
regulate sexual conduct and expression that may affect the town in its
entirety.
JenniferD.Dougherty

PRODUCTS

LIABILITY INSTRUCTIONS
TO JURIES INDETERMINATE PRODUCT DEFECT TEST ALLOWS A JURY TO INFER
THAT A PRODUCT DEFECT EXISTED AT THE TIME OF DISTRIBUTION OR
SALE - Myrnak v. PortAuthority, 157 N.J. 84, 723 A.2d 45 (1999).
On July 6, 1991, plaintiff John Myrlak suffered a back injury at
his place of employment when the chair upon which he was seated
collapsed. See Myrlak v. Port Authority, 157 N.J. 84, 90, 723 A.2d 45, 48
(1999). At the time of the accident, Myrlak, six-foot-six-inches in
height and weighing 325-pounds, was working in Jersey City as an assistant trainmaster for the Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation
(PATH). See id. at 90-91, 723 A.2d at 48-49. Myrlak had been sitting
in the movable desk chair for approximately one hour and forty-five
minutes when the back of the chair gave way, sending both the chair
and Myrlak to the floor. Myrlak was hospitalized as a result of his injuries. Although none of Myrlak's co-workers witnessed the accident,
several testified that they had heard loud clicking or grinding noises
and subsequently saw the chair lying on the floor. Following the accident, a co-worker examined the chair and observed that-it lacked
back support.
The chair had been recently manufactured by co-defendant
Girsberger Industries, Inc. (Girsberger), and was in use for only five
weeks: Myrlak was familiar with the chair's operation and that it allowed for both height and back-support adjustment. Although several PATH employees, some of whom shared Myrlak's physical proportions, had consistently used the chair, none had ever registered a
complaint regarding its function. See id. at 92, 723 A.2d at 49. Furthermore, the chair exhibited no signs of misuse..
Myrlak brought an action against PATH under the Federal Employer's Liability Act (FELA), claiming that PATH maintained an unsafe workplace and negligently provided a chair that was too small for
a man of his size. See id. Myrlak also filed products liability claims
against Girsberger, alleging manufacturing defects in the chair. See
id. At trial, Myrlak's expert witness was unable to identify any structural defect in the chair, nor could he state, with certainty, that a defect prompted the accident. See id. at 93, 723 A.2d at 50. Although
Myrlak wanted the jury to infer, through circumstantial evidence,
that there was a manufacturing defect in the chair, the trial court re1675
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fused to provide the jury with a res ipsa loquitur instruction regarding the products liability claims. See id. Subsequently, the jury found
that PATH negligently provided Myrlak with an unsafe workplace
and that Myrlak failed to establish the presence of a manufacturing
defect in the chair. See id.
The New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, reversed
and remanded the matter. See id. The court reversed the negligence
verdict against PATH for evidentiary reasons. See id. The court also
reversed the verdict against the manufacturer Girsberger, concluding
that the trial court should have given the jury a res ipsa loquitur instruction. See id. Girsberger subsequently appealed. See id.
The New Jersey Supreme Court granted certification to determine whether res ipsa loquitur should apply in the instant case. See
id. (citing Myrlak v. Port Authority, 152 N.J. 10, 702 A.2d 349 (1997)).
The court held that the indeterminate product defect test, rather
than a res ipsa loquitur instruction, should apply in strict products
liability cases. See id. at 106, 723 A.2d at 56.
Justice Coleman, writing for a unanimous court, commenced
the opinion with an historical and substantive review of the res ipsa
loquitur doctrine. See id. at 94, 723 A.2d at 50. The justice related
that res ipsa loquitur, or "the thing speaks for itself," is an evidentiary
rule that is applied in certain negligence cases. See id. at 95, 723 A.2d
at 51. The justice continued to explain that negligence will not be
presumed; rather, a plaintiff must ordinarily prove negligence. See id.
The justice noted, however, that when a court applies res ipsa loquitur, the doctrine allows ajury circumstantially to prove a defendant's
lack of due care provided that: (1) The occurrence of the event itself
would ordinarily indicate negligence, (2) The instrumentality that
caused the harm was in defendant's exclusive control, and (3) Circumstances do not suggest that the injury resulted from plaintiffs
neglect or voluntary act. See id. (citing Bornstein v. Metropolitan Bottling Co., 26 N.J. 263, 269, 139 A.2d 404, 408 (1958)). The justice further noted that the doctrine may apply even when a defendant lacks
exclusive control of the instrumentality at the time of the incident, as
long as the plaintiff can demonstrate that the instrumentality was neither mishandled nor altered after the defendant relinquished control. See id. Justice Coleman observed that res ipsa loquitur is normally available if it is "more probable than not" that a defendant has
been negligent. See id. Concluding the court's review of the doctrine, the justice further explained that its application requires a defendant, who often possesses superior knowledge of the instrumen-
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tality, to explain the circumstances that led to injury. See id. at 96,
723 A.2d at 51.
The court proceeded to comment upon a plaintiff's burden in a
typical products liability cause of action. See id. The court explained
that, in a products liability action in which a manufacturing defect is
alleged, a plaintiff need not prove that the manufacturer acted negligently. See id. Instead, the court indicated, a plaintiff must expose
fault in the product itself. See id. The court then explained that both
FELA and the Restatement emphasize the product's safety rather
than the manufacturer's conduct. See id. at 96-97, 723 A.2d at 51-52
(citing N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:58C-2 (West 1987) and Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 2 (a) (1997)). Nonetheless, the
court stressed that a manufacturer will not be held automatically liable in a strict liability case simply because a plaintiff need not prove
fault. See id. at 97, 723 A.2d at 52. The court emphasized that a
plaintiff must still demonstrate that the product was defective when it
left the manufacturer's control and that the defective product was the
proximate cause of injury to the plaintiff - an intended or reasonably foreseeable user. See id.
Focusing on the plaintiff's evidentiary burden, the court stated
that a product is defective "if it is not reasonably fit, suitable, or safe
for the ordinary or foreseeable purpose for which it is sold." Id.
(citing Waterson v. General Motors Corp., 111 N.J. 238, 267, 544 A.2d
357, 372 (1988)). The court asserted that a plaintiff, in order to
show that a product was defective while in the manufacturer's control, may proffer direct evidence, or if such evidence is unavailable,
the plaintiff may proffer circumstantial proof. See id. at 98, 723 A.2d
at 52. Proof of a specific defect, the court added, is not necessary. See
id. Instead, the court noted, a plaintiff must show only that
"'something was wrong' with the product." See id. (quoting Scanlon v.
GeneralMotors Corp., 65 N.J. 582, 591, 326 A.2d 673, 677 (1974)). The
court underscored, however, that the occurrence of an accident or
the presence of injury alone does not prove that a product defect existed. See id. The court reflected upon the circumstantial evidence
approach dictated in Scanlon and concluded that while factors such as
the age of the product and the frequency of its use are dispositive
only in rare circumstances, they may be considered in conjunction
with other proffered evidence. See id. at 98-99, 723 A.2d at 52-53
(citing Scanlon, 65 N.J. at 593, 326 A.2d at 673).
Justice Coleman next highlighted a third approach to proving
product defect. See id. at 99, 723 A.2d at 53. The justice declared
that, aside from the use of direct or circumstantial evidence, product
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defect at the time of manufacture may be established if the plaintiff is
capable of negating other possible causes of product failure that
could not be attributable to the defendant. See id. The justice stated
that this would permit a reasonable inference that a dangerous condition existed while the defendant controlled the product. See id.
The justice stressed, however, that a plaintiff need not eliminate all
conceivable causes of failure - only those likely to have caused failure. See id.
Having defined the various evidentiary approaches to establishing product defect, the court next distinguished the application of
res ipsa loquitur to negligence matters from use of the doctrine in
strict products liability causes of action. See id. at 99-100, 723 A.2d at
53. The court observed that res ipsa loquitur essentially stems from
the negligence doctrine and is used to infer lack of due care through
circumstantial evidence. See id. at 99, 723 A.2d at 53. The court recognized that strict products liability, conversely, is premised upon a
policy that a manufacturer should be called to account for harmful
products that it constructs, regardless of fault, unreasonableness, or
negligence. See id. at 99-100, 723 A.2d at 53. In a strict products liability context, the court maintained, negligence simply is not a concern. See id. at 100, 723 A.2d at 53. Positing nonetheless that res ipsa
loquitur might have a rightful place in products liability litigation,
the court proceeded to explore its potential application in that
arena. See id.
Seeking guidance from the commentary accompanying FELA,
the court discerned that the NewJersey State Legislature did not wish
to deviate from the common law approach to strict products liability.
See id. at 100, 723 A.2d at 53. Additionally, the court acknowledged
the language in FELA that disavowed any intent to alter then-existing
burdens of proof in such cases. See id. (citing N.J. Stat. Ann.
§ 2A:58C-7 (West 1987)). In light of this legislative guidance, the
court commenced an examination of relevant New Jersey case law to
determine the appropriateness of a res ipsa loquitur instruction
within a strict products liability context. See id. at 101-03, 723 A.2d at
53-55.
Justice Coleman noted that res ipsa loquitur jury charges had
been soundly rejected by the court in products liability cases involving only a single defendant and a single theory of liability. See id. at
100, 723 A.2d at 53 (citing Corbin v. Camden Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 60
N.J. 425, 435-36, 290 A.2d 441, 446-47 (1972)). By contrast, the justice perceived that the court had embraced such an instruction when
multiple theories of liability and multiple defendants were present.
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See id. at 100-01, 723 A.2d at 53-54 (citing Anderson v. Somberg, 67 NJ.
291, 298, 338 A.2d 1, 5 (1975)). The justice remarked that the application of res ipsa loquitur in cases such as Anderson shifted the burdens of production and persuasion to the defendants. See id. at 100,
723 A.2d at 53. Furthermore, the court recognized that products liability cases upholding the application of a res ipsa loquitur charge
shared several "highly fact-sensitive" characteristics. See id. at 101, 723
A.2d at 54. The court noted that each case involved multiple theories of liability and multiple defendants, at least one of whom clearly
had to have been responsible for injury suffered by the plaintiff. See
id. Moreover, the court added, the plaintiff in each case was anesthetized, helpless, or had inordinately less information about the source
of injury than did the defendants. See id. The court concluded that
these factors were "simply not present" in the instant case. See id.
Moreover, the court declared forthrightly that the use of a res
ipsa loquitur charge in strict products liability cases involving just one
defendant is unprecedented in NewJersey. See id. A firm majority of
other jurisdictions, added the court, has also rejected the doctrine's
usage in similar circumstances. See id. at 102, 723 A.2d at 54. The
court defended this widespread refusal to utilize the doctrine in single-defendant products liability cases by repeating that, in such cases,
the plaintiff is not seeking to establish the manufacturer's negligence
but, rather, is attempting to prove that the product had a defect while
under the control of the manufacturer. See id. Res ipsa loquitur is illsuited for this task, the court continued, for it traditionally has been
used as a fault-finding device. See id.
Shifting attention to the case at bar, Justice Coleman maintained
that the trial court's refusal to grant a res ipsa loquitur instruction
would have been proper even if the court were to adopt its use in
single-defendant products liability cases. See id. at 103, 723 A.2d at
55. Considering the constant use of the chair by several PATH employees, the possibility that it could have been adjusted repeatedly
prior to collapse, and Myrlak's inability at trial to replicate the accident or expose a manufacturing defect, the justice concluded that
the proofs simply failed to demonstrate that the chair was defective.
See id.
Next, the court reflected upon a possible alternative to a res ipsa
loquitur charge under these circumstances. See id. The court identified the indeterminate product defect test, which stemmed from the
Scanlon circumstantial evidence approach as adopted in the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability. See id. at 103-05, 723 A.2d
at 55-56. The court noted that this test would apply when the plain-
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tiff is unable to prove a specific defect. See id,at 105, 723 A.2d at 56.
The court perceived that this test, like res ipsa loquitur, was inferential: If the incident was one that would not normally occur absent defect and if it did not result solely from causes other than "'product
defect existing at the time of sale or distribution,"' then a jury may
infer that plaintiff's injury was the result of such a defect. Id, at 104,
723 A.2d at 55 (quoting Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 3 (1997)). The court distinguished res ipsa loquitur from
the indeterminate product defect test, stating that while the former
permits an inference of negligence, the latter creates two inferences:
(1) The incident resulted from product defect, and (2) The defect
existed at the time of distribution or sale. See id. The court added
that these inferential requirements can be satisfied through direct or
circumstantial evidence, or by negating possible causes of product
failure not attributable to the manufacturer. See id. at 105, 723 A.2d
at 56. The court concluded its explanation of the indeterminate
product defect test by stressing that the test shares res ipsa loquitur's
theoretical foundation. See id. at 104, 723 A.2d at 55-56. Both theories, the court affirmed, stem from the notion that an accident itself
can suggest liability "'if it is reasonably plain that the defect was not
introduced after the product was sold."' Id. at 104-05, 723 A.2d at 56
(quoting Welge v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 17 F.3d 209, 211 (7th Cir.
1994)). Agreeing with this logic, the court explicitly adopted the indeterminate product defect test as set forth in the Restatement. See
id. at 106, 723 A.2d at 56.
Mindful of the Legislature's desire to keep the common law intact, the court traced the evolution of res ipsa loquitur in NewJersey,
and insisted that the state has a firmly established policy of allowing
plaintiffs circumstantially to prove negligence upon satisfaction of
certain threshold conditions. See id. The court proffered that the
American Law Institute's adoption of section 3 of the Restatement
occurred at a time when NewJersey had developed the res ipsa loquitur doctrine to a point at which it could be invoked even after the instrumentality that caused the harm left the defendant's control. See
id. The court declared that as a result, the indeterminate product defect test, as applied in cases of strict products liability, "does precisely
what res ipsa loquitur does in a negligence context" and, similar to
res ipsa loquitur, does not shift the burden of proof. Id. at 106-07,
723 A.2d at 56-57.
Finally, the court found that Myrlak was not prejudiced by the
trial court's refusal to allow a res ipsa loquitur instruction. See id. at
107, 723 A.2d at 57. Since the trial court instructed the jury that it
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was permitted to infer a defect by relying on circumstantial evidence
presented, the court held that the charge given was the functional
equivalent of the indeterminate product defect test. See id. The
court upheld the ruling of the appellate division yet professed that
the prejudicial evidentiary error in the lower court ultimately demanded a new trial. See id. at 107-08, 723 A.2d at 57.
The indeterminate product defect test provides juries with a
valuable, practical, and logical fact-finding tool. By explicitly adopting section 3 of the Restatement, the court recognized that gaps in a
plaintiff's evidence, which exist in part because of the manufacturer's
sole possession of specialized technical expertise, can be filled with
logic, sound reasoning, and common sense. As the court appropriately noted, "' [S] ome circumstantial evidence is very strong, as when
you find a trout in milk."' Id. at 105, 723 A.2d at 56 (citing Embs v.
Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 528 S.W.2d 703, 706 (Ky. 1975) (quoting
Henry David Thoreau)). The court properly acknowledged that
plaintiffs should not be penalized for an informational disadvantage
that is beyond their control. Likewise, manufacturers subject to strict
products liability, much like caregivers subject to suits for negligence,
can no longer use their singular, particularized knowledge to shield
themselves from responsibility. Additionally, by maintaining the requirement that a plaintiff initially come forth with sufficient direct or
circumstantial evidence, the court ensured that plaintiffs generally
will not receive unjustifiable windfalls. The court properly adopted
the law to ensure equity, recognizing that, regardless of whether a
plaintiff seeks to establish negligence or the existence of a product
defect at a particular moment in time, inferences should be permitted when the thing speaks for itself.

StuartJ Goldstein

INSURANCE SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY A PLAINTIFF CAN
MAINTAIN A DIRECT, STRICT LIABILIY ACTION AGAINST THE INSURER
OF FIREWORKS DISPLAY, BUT PLAINTIFF MUST PROVE THAT THE
FIREWORKS DISPLAY WAS THE "BUT FOR" AND PROXIMATE CAUSE OF
HIS INJURY, AND INSURER CAN RELY UPON PLAINTIFF'S NEGLIGENCE AS
AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE Cruz-Mendez v. ISUlInsurance Services of

San Francisco, 156 N.J. 556, 722 A.2d 515 (1999).
The Montclair Golf Club (Golf Club) sponsored a fireworks display, exhibited by Girone, Inc. (Girone), on its property on July 4,
1991, in the Township of West Orange.
See Cruz-Mendez v.
ISU/InsuranceServices of San Francisco,156 NJ. 556, 562, 722 A.2d 515,
518 (1999). Five days later, a Golf Club grounds keeper, Hector
Cruz-Mendez, found a firework in the glove box of a groundskeeping
golf cart. Recognizing the object as a firework similar to those he
had cleaned up on July 5th after the fireworks display, Cruz-Mendez
removed it from the glove box. Cruz-Mendez noticed that the fuse
was burned and believed that the firework had already exploded.
Nonetheless, Cruz-Mendez used a small shovel to enlarge a hole in
the firework to reach an unburned section of the fuse. Cruz-Mendez
then lit the fuse, and when the firework exploded, it injured his left
hand.
Before a fireworks display can be held in New Jersey, an exhibitor is required to obtain a municipal permit. Sections 21:3-3 and -5
of the New Jersey Statutes set forth the conditions upon which a
permit may be granted. Section 21:3-3 provides in relevant part,
"'The governing body of any municipality... may, upon application
in writing, upon the posting of a suitable bond, grant a permit for the
purchase, possession and public display of fireworks. ..."'
Id.
(quoting N.J. Stat. Ann. § 21:3-3 (West 1992)). Section 21:3-5 states
that "'the municipality shall require surety which may be cash, government bonds, personal bond, or other form of insurance"' to pay
all damages caused by reason of the fireworks display to person or
property. Id. at 563, 722 A.2d at 518 (quoting N.J. Stat. Ann. § 21:3-5
(West 1992)). The surety "'shall run to the municipality in which the
license is granted, and shall be for the use and benefit of any person"' damaged by reason of the fireworks display. Id. (quoting N.J.
Stat. Ann. § 21:3-5 (West 1992)).
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In a written contract, the Golf Club and Girone agreed upon the
procedure for obtaining the necessary permit for the fireworks display. Girone agreed to furnish the Golf Club with all necessary personnel, equipment, and materials. See id., 722 A.2d at 518-19. In addition, Girone promised to provide property damage and public
liability insurance, in accord with the limits set forth by the municipality, that named the Golf Club as an additional insured. See id., 722
A.2d at 519. The Golf Club, in return, promised to furnish Girone
with all required permits and Permit Authorization and Insurance
Requisition Forms. A vice president of the Golf Club, Joseph B. Dillenbeck, completed the Insurance Requisition Form (Form) and delivered it to Girone. The Form indicated that the Township and the
Golf Club were to be named additional insureds in the Certificate of
Insurance (Certificate). The Certificate named the Township and
the Golf Club, as well as Girone, as insureds. It stated further that
the insurance policy (Policy) "provided 'General Liability Insurance,'
including 'Premises/Operations,' 'Contractual Liability,' 'Products/
Completed Operations,' and 'Public Display' coverage." Id. The Policy was submitted to the Township as part of the Golf Club's application to obtain permission to conduct the fireworks display. See id.
When completing the application, Dillenbeck answered "yes" to
a question that inquired whether the application was accompanied by
the required surety bond, even though Dillenbeck subsequently testified that he understood the Policy as providing only liability coverage
for personal injury and property damage. See id. at 563-64, 722 A.2d
at 519. Subject to proof of general liability, the Township approved
the Golf Club's application for a permit to display fireworks. See id. at
564, 722 A.2d at 519.
Cruz-Mendez commenced a negligence action against the Golf
Club, Girone, and a related company, Vineland Fireworks Company.
See id. at 565, 722 A.2d at 520. The plaintiff later filed a second complaint asserting a direct, strict liability claim under the Policy against
the issuers of the Policy and the brokers that procured the Policy
(collectively, Insurers) as well as Girone. See id. The law division
dismissed the complaint against the Golf Club, as the plaintiff had
received worker's compensation benefits. See id. Subsequently, CruzMendez amended the second complaint to assert that the Insurers
and Girone negligently represented that they had acquired the required surety when they had not. See id. All of the actions were consolidated for discovery purposes. See id.
The NewJersey Superior Court, Law Division, granted summary
judgment in favor of the plaintiff. See id. at 566, 722 A.2d at 520. The
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court interpreted section 21:3-3 to require the posting of surety to
protect members of the public, without obligating them to demonstrate fault on the part of companies displaying fireworks. See id. The
court concluded that Cruz-Mendez's injury was caused by the fireworks display and that the plaintiff s negligence could not be asserted
as an affirmative defense. See id.
The parties stipulated to the dismissal of Girone as a defendant
and to the amount of damages, and the Insurers agreed to indemnify
Girone. See id. The Insurers appealed to the New Jersey Superior
Court, Appellate Division, which affirmed the law division's ruling.
See id.
The New Jersey Supreme Court granted the Insurers' petition
for certification and affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
the matter to the law division. See id. The court held that a plaintiff,
injured by reason of a fireworks display, can maintain a direct, strict
liability cause of action under the insurance policy against the Insurers. See id. The court specified that the plaintiff must prove that the
fireworks display was the "but for" and proximate cause of his injury.
See id. Further, the court held that the Insurers can use the plaintiff's
comparative fault as an affirmative defense. See id.
Justice Pollock, writing for a unanimous court, began by examining whether section 21:3-5 provided an exception to the general rule
that plaintiffs in tort actions cannot directly sue Insurers. See id. at
566-67, 722 A.2d at 520-21. The court concluded that, for more than
fifty years, fireworks exhibitors and their insurers have known that
the current statute and its predecessor have authorized an injured
plaintiff to maintain a direct action against the insurer without proof
of the fireworks exhibitor's fault. See id. at 567, 722 A.2d at 521.
Stressing that the words chosen by the Legislature are chosen
for a reason, the court stated that the term "surety" as used in section
21:3-5 indicates a specific contractual relationship allowing a direct
action against the surety. See id. at 569, 722 A.2d at 522. Although
the plaintiff was not a party to the surety contract, the court explained that the statute expands the class of obligees to include those
injured by the fireworks display. See id.
The court rejected the Insurers' position that, in directing municipalities to require a surety, section 21:3-5 is permissive and not
mandatory. See id. at 570, 722 A.2d at 522. The use of the word
"shall," Justice Pollock determined, indicates that the Legislature intended to mandate a surety. See id. Thus, the court concluded that
the statute requires an exhibitor, when applying for a permit to op-
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erate a fireworks display, to procure a surety instrument allowing a
direct action against the insurer. See id.
The court further rejected the alternative contention of the Insurers that, even if a surety is required by the statute, the Policy can
only be read as a general liability policy. See id. When interpreting
insurance policies, the court pointed out, unclear contractual language is interpreted against the insurer and in favor of the insured.
See id. at 571, 722 A.2d at 522-23. In order to determine coverage,
Justice Pollock explained, if the terms of the policy differ from the
parties' purpose for entering into the contract, the focus shifts to that
purpose. See id. at 571-72, 722 A.2d at 523. The justice maintained
that the purpose of the Policy was to comply with the statutory requirement that the exhibitor provide a surety to protect the public.
See id. at 572, 722 A.2d at 523. Therefore, the court concluded that
the absence of the term surety in the Policy did not preclude the interpretation that the Policy was in fact one of suretyship - rather
than indemnification as the Insurers argued - and authorized a direct action. See id.
The court then reviewed the standard of liability applicable to a
person injured by a fireworks display. See id. at 573, 722 A.2d at 524.
At common law, the court recounted, a person injured by fireworks
must prove negligence on the part of the exhibitor. See id. The court
recognized, however, that section 21:3-5 expands the scope of the
common law to allow the imposition of liability even when the display
has been conducted carefully. See id. The statute, Justice Pollock asserted, requires exhibitors to "obtain insurance policies under which
their insurers are strictly liable for injuries caused by fireworks displays." Id. at 574, 722 A.2d at 524.
Disagreeing with the lower courts' determination that, as a matter of law, Cruz-Mendez had satisfied the requirement of causation
because his injury was attributable to a fireworks display, the court
emphasized that a plaintiff must prove causation, even in a strict liability action. See id. Justice Pollock set forth the two elements of
causation: factual or "but for" causation and proximate causation.
See id. The justice clarified that a plaintiff must show that the defendant's act (or omission) was the "but for" or factual cause of the
plaintiff's injury, such that, but for a certain event, the occurrence of
the injury probably would not have happened. See id. Even in a strict
liability action, the justice instructed, a plaintiff must prove further
that this factual or "but for" cause was a proximate cause of his injury.
See id. The court elucidated that a proximate cause is one which
probably and naturally led to and may have been expected to bring
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about the accident alleged. See id. at 575, 722 A.2d at 524. A tortfeasor, Justice Pollock underscored, is not relieved of liability for intervening causes - those that are the normal incidents of risk or are
reasonably foreseeable. See id., 722 A.2d at 525.
The court determined that the Legislature, by using the word
"caused" in section 21:3-5, intended to require proof of proximate
cause. See id. Therefore, the court concluded that, in an action on a
surety contract issued to comply with section 21:3-5, a plaintiff must
prove that the fireworks display was both the "but for" and the
proximate cause of his injury. See id. at 576, 722 A.2d at 525. The
justice observed that the facts of this case, however, prevented the
court from holding that the fireworks display was or was not the
proximate cause of the plaintiffs injury. See id. Justice Pollock hypothesized that ajury could find that the acts of Cruz-Mendez constituted an intervening cause that was so unforeseeable as to break the
chain of causation. See id. Alternatively, the justice pondered, a jury
could find it foreseeable that a person may light an unexploded firework left after a fireworks display. See id. Therefore, the court decided that the determination of proximate cause was best left to a
jury. See id. Justice Pollock clarified, however, that proximate cause
connotes closeness of causal connection and not nearness of distance
or time as the Insurers had argued. See id. at 577, 722 A.2d at 526.
Finally, the court addressed the effect of Cruz-Mendez's negligence on the Insurers' liability under section 21:3-5. See id. The
court considered the Comparative Negligence Act, which allows a
plaintiff's own negligence to be considered in allocating liability
among parties and reduces a plaintiffs recovery by the percentage of
negligence attributable to him. See id. Justice Pollock stated that a
plaintiffs negligence is an affirmative defense in strict liability actions
if his conduct "constitutes an unreasonable and voluntary exposure
to a known risk." Id. at 577-78, 722 A.2d at 526 (citing Lewis v. American Cyanamid Co., 155 NJ. 544, 558-59, 715 A.2d 967, 974 (1998)).
Thus, the justice indicated that the mere fact that Cruz-Mendez was
negligent would not suffice to establish an affirmative defense for the
Insurers. See id. at 578, 722 A.2d at 526. Rather, the court stressed
that the Insurers must prove that Cruz-Mendez had actual knowledge
of the danger and, nonetheless, voluntarily encountered the risk. See
id. Justice Pollock then noted that "a secondary obligor that issued a
surety contract may present any defenses available to the insured."
Id. Finally, the court concluded that the effect of Cruz-Mendez's negligence and the allocation of responsibility among the plaintiff and
the defendants was an issue for the jury. See id.
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By allowing plaintiffs a direct, strict liability action against insurers, yet allowing insurers to assert plaintiffs comparative fault as an
affirmative defense to liability, the New Jersey Supreme Court strikes
a balance between competing interests. Although insurers are liable
for the acts of the exhibitors they insure, regardless of the degree of
care exercised by the exhibitors, they are not unlimitedly responsible
for injuries caused in part by a plaintiff who knowingly takes unreasonable risks.

Tricia M. Lawrence

CRIMINAL LAW

-

IMPLIED CONSENT LAW

-

ANYrHING LESS THAN

UNCONDITIONAL ASSENT TO REQUEST TO SUBMIT TO BREATHALYZER

TEST CONSTITUTES A REFUSAL

-

State v. Widmaier, 157 N.J. 475, 724

A.2d 241 (1999).
John Widmaier was arrested and charged with driving while intoxicated (DWI) and refusing to submit to a breathalyzer test on July
14, 1996. See State v. Widmaier, 157 N.J. 475, 481, 724 A.2d 241, 244
(1999). Widmaier was driving in Little Egg Harbor Township just after 3:00 a.m. on July 14 when a local police officer in a marked patrol
car pulled over his vehicle. According to the officer, Widmaier's vehicle crossed the center line of a highway twice, executed a turn
without using a directional signal, and twice seemed as if it was going
to skid but did not. See id. at 482, 724 A.2d at 244. Based on those
observations, the officer pulled over Widmaier's vehicle. The officer
reportedly asked Widmaier to perform several field sobriety tests and
arrested him for driving while intoxicated. See id. at 483, 724 A.2d at
244-45.
Widmaier was taken to police headquarters, where the officer set
up a video camera and the police department's breathalyzer machine
in preparation of administering a breathalyzer test to the suspect. See
id., 724 A.2d at 245. The officer read to Widmaier a ten-paragraph
statement prepared by the state Division of Motor Vehicles (DMV)
and designed to explain the Implied Consent Law, also called the refusal statute by the court, which governs administration of breathalyzer tests and requires that any DWI suspect submit to the test. See
id. at 483-84, 724 A.2d at 245-46. The instructions informed the suspect that his Mirandarights to remain silent and to have an attorney
did not apply to the requirement to submit to a breathalyzer test and
repeated that the suspect is required by law to submit to the test. The
statement spelled out the consequences of a refusal to consent to the
test, including revocation of the suspect's driver's license for six
months for a first offense under the refusal statute, for two years for a
second offense, and for ten years for a third or subsequent refusal, as
well as fines ranging from $250-500 and required attendance at an
Intoxicated Driver Resource Center (IDRC) program. See id. at 484,
724 A.2d at 245. These requirements are nearly identical to the pun-
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ishments assessed for DWI offenses and must be served independent
of any DWI or other penalties.
After reading the explanation of the state's breathalyzer refusal
statute, the officer reportedly asked Widmaier if he would submit to
the test, at which point Widmaier asked the officer to call his attorney. See id., 724 A.2d at 246. The officer then read additional instructions meant to re-inform any suspect who gives an equivocal answer to the request to submit to the breathalyzer test that the law
requires his submission to the test and that any refusal to answer,
failure to respond, request for an attorney, assertion of the right to
remain silent, request to see a doctor, or any other delay in submitting to the test would be deemed a refusal and the suspect would be
issued a summons for violating the refusal statute. See id. at 484-85,
724 A.2d at 246. After reading this second set of instructions, the officer again asked the suspect if he would submit to the test and Widmaier reportedly said, "I agree to the samples of my breath, but I
would like my attorney present for calibration purposes." Id. at 485,
724 A.2d at 246. The officer reportedly again told the defendant that
he did not have a right to an attorney and issued to him summonses
for refusing to submit to the breathalyzer test, DWI, and failure to
remain in his lane while driving.
Widmaier was convicted in municipal court of DWI, which subsumed the lane-maintenance charge. See id. His driver's license was
revoked for six months, and he was assessed fines and court fees and
was ordered to attend an IDRC program. See id. Widmaier was acquitted of the refusal charge, however, since the trial judge determined that the defendant's conditional agreement to take the
breathalyzer test did not constitute a refusal under the statute. See id.
Both parties appealed, and the law division, after a de novo trial,
reached the same result, convicting Widmaier of DWI and acquitting
him of refusing to submit to the breathalyzer test. See id. The court
found that Widmaier had not knowingly violated the refusal statute
and stated that the police officer could have done a better job of assuring that the suspect understood the mandatory nature of the test,
the requirement of unequivocal consent, and the ramifications of a
conditional assent to the test. See id. at 485-86, 724 A.2d at 246. The
law division also determined that, because the penalties assessed under the refusal statutes are civil rather than criminal in nature, the
State's appeal of the defendant's acquittal was not barred by the
double jeopardy clauses of the United States and NewJersey constitutions. See id. at 485, 724 A.2d at 246.
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Both parties, again, appealed and the appellate division affirmed
the law division's ruling, noting that consent was a fact issue and that
the trial court's findings of fact were sufficiently supported by the
evidence. See id. at 485, 724 A.2d at 246-47. The appellate court did
not rule on the double jeopardy issue because it found that the penalties for a refusal violation were the same as those for the DWI conviction and, thus, did not implicate double jeopardy principles. See
id. at 486, 724 A.2d at 247. The New Jersey Supreme Court granted
certification to determine what level of consent is required under the
breathalyzer refusal statute and whether a DWI suspect has a right to
consult with an attorney prior to submitting to a breathalyzer test. See
id. Although neither party appealed the issue, the court also elected
to address whether double jeopardy principles bar the State from appealing an acquittal under the refusal law. See id.
In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Stein, the supreme
court began its analysis by exploring the legislative history of the
state's DWI statutes, including the refusal statute at issue, the Implied
Consent Law. (citing N.J. Stat. Ann. § 39:4-50.2 (West 1982)). See id.
at 487, 724 A.2d at 247. Acknowledging a strong legislative intent to
rid the state's roads of drunk drivers, the court noted that the refusal
statute imposes on drivers an affirmative obligation to submit to
breathalyzer testing when suspected of a DWI offense such that anyone operating a vehicle in New Jersey is deemed by statute to have
consented to such testing. See id. The court claimed that breath
samples are non-testimonial evidence and, accordingly, a suspect has
no right under the Fifth Amendment or the Mirandadoctrine to consult with or have an attorney present when giving the sample. See id.
Noting the evanescent nature of breathalyzer evidence, the court reasoned that the state had justification for requiring immediate acquiescence to the tests, since a suspect's blood alcohol count dissipates
rapidly. See id. at 487-88, 724 A.2d at 247. Accordingly, the court
found a strong public policy basis for the legislative requirements of
the refusal statute. See id. at 488, 724 A.2d at 247. The court noted
that while an officer may not force a suspect to take the test, the Legislature provided for strong disincentives to refusal by spelling out severe punishments for refusal that are equivalent to those for DWI offenses. See id. at 488, 724 A.2d at 247-48. The court also noted that
the refusal statute provides procedural safeguards in the form of the
DMV-prescribed instructions for suspects to assure that they understand that their full and unequivocal assent is required by law, that
they recognize that they lack the right to counsel when asked to take
a breathalyzer test, and that they apprehend the consequences of a
refusal to submit to the test. See id. at 489, 724 A.2d at 248.
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In assessing the degree of equivocation that will be deemed a refusal under the Implied Consent Law, the court reviewed lower court
opinions that determined that anything short of full assent is deemed
to be a refusal. See id. at 488, 724 A.2d at 247-48. The court endorsed
the findings of several lower courts and adopted as a rule that any
degree of equivocation, anything short of unconditional consent,
constituted a refusal under the Implied Consent Law. See id. at 497,
724 A.2d at 252. Adopting the language promulgated by the law division in State v. Corrado, 184 N.J. Super. 561, 569, 446 A.2d 1229, 1233
(App. Div. 1982) and accepted a decade later in State v. Bernhardt,245
NJ. Super. 210, 219, 584 A.2d 854, 859 (App. Div.), certif denied, 126
NJ. 323, 598 A.2d 883 (1991), the court stated that "anything substantially short of an unconditional, unequivocal assent... constitutes a refusal" under the breathalyzer refusal statute. Widmaier, 157
NJ. at 497, 724 A. 2d at 252. Further, the court explained that a request by a police officer for a sample of a DWI suspect's breath is
"not an occasion for debate, maneuver or negotiation," but calls for
"a simple 'yes' or 'no' to the officer's request." Id. The court reasoned that such a hard line was necessary in order to assure adequate
enforcement of the state's DWI and refusal laws. See id. Justice Stein
noted that allowing a suspect to delay taking the test by producing
equivocal responses, asking to see an attorney or doctor, or otherwise
failing immediately to manifest assent to performing the test would
undermine the ability of the police to combat drunk driving. See id.
In applying its standards to Widmaier's case, the court determined that the defendant was adequately apprised of his statutory obligation to submit to the breathalyzer test and that he had no right to
consult with or have an attorney present at the time of his test. See id.
The court also deemed Widmaier's response - that he agreed to the
test but wanted his attorney present - sufficiently conditional to
amount to a refusal to submit to the breathalyzer test; thus, it constituted a violation of the statutory requirement of unconditional assent. See id. Because a police officer is not obligated to force a defendant to perform the breath test, the court concluded that the
police officer properly understood Widmaier's "conditional and ambiguous response" to be a refusal. See id. The court stated that the
defendant's subjective intent regarding whether he assented or not is
immaterial and that only a manifestation of unconditional assent to
taking the test meets the statute's demands. See id. at 498, 724 A.2d at
252. The court professed that it was "fully persuaded" that Widmaier
understood his statutory obligation to assent and that his conduct
amounted to a knowing violation of the refusal statute. See id., 724
A.2d at 253. Nevertheless, the court proceeded to recommend that
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the state DMV revise the breathalyzer administration instructions to
clarify the suspect's duty to submit unconditionally to the test and to
assure that the suspect understands that any response that is equivocal or conditional in any way will be deemed to be a refusal and will
subject the suspect to a summons under the refusal statute. See id. at
499, 724 A.2d at 253.
In considering whether the State's appeal of Widmaier's acquittal violated double jeopardy principles of the New Jersey and United
States Constitutions, the court relied primarily on United States Supreme Court precedents, noting that the federal and state double
jeopardy clauses and case law have been interpreted as "coextensive." See id. at 489-94, 490, 724 A.2d at 248-50, 248. Reflecting
on that line of precedent, the court noted that the double jeopardy
doctrine protects individuals against being prosecuted a second time
for the same offense, whether after acquittal or conviction, and prohibits the government from imposing multiple punishments for the
same offense. See id. at 489-90, 724 A.2d at 248. Generally, the court
noted, an acquittal is not appealable under double jeopardy principles if the fact finder's decision resolved the core factual elements at
issue, even if it appears that the determination was egregiously in error. See id. at 490, 724 A.2d at 248-49. Reviewing the instances in
which an acquittal may be constitutionally appealed, the court noted
that the termination of a prosecution in a defendant's favor may only
be appealed when a court's ruling was not based on a finding of factual guilt or innocence. See id. at 491, 724 A.2d at 249. These circumstances include a mistrial declared at the court's initiative or at
the defendant's own request, a case dismissed on procedural rather
than factual grounds, an acquittal entered through a judgment notwithstanding a jury's verdict of guilt, a dismissal based solely on lack
of jurisdiction, a determination of a mere pretrial order, or a new
trial ordered before a defendant had faced jeopardy for the offense.
See id.
The court noted that the double jeopardy bar on appeal or retrial applies to both criminal and quasi-criminal proceedings, but not
to purely civil matters unless the punishment meted out is so punitive
in purpose or effect to make it the functional equivalent for double
jeopardy purposes of a criminal sanction. See id. at 492-93, 724 A.2d
at 250. In such cases, even a legislative description of a statutory punishment as civil in nature will not preclude a court from determining
that the punishment is criminal for double jeopardy purposes, but
the court said it must find clear proof to override such a legislative
designation. See id. at 493, 724 A.2d at 250. To differentiate between
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civil, hence appealable, and punitive criminal sanctions that may not
be appealed under the double jeopardy doctrine, the court pointed
to the United States Supreme Court's seven-factor analysis developed
over the years and most recently articulated in Hudson v. United States,
522 U.S. 93 (1997). See Widmaier, 157 N.J. at 493, 724 A.2d at 250.
To determine if a sanction is civil or punitive, Justice Stein stated that
the court should consider whether a sanction: (1) imposes an affirmative disability or restraint; (2) historically has been considered
as punitive; (3) requires a finding of scienter on behalf of the defendant; (4) serves retribution and deterrence, the traditional aims of
punishment; (5) applies to otherwise criminal behavior; (6) serves
alternative purposes; and (7) seems excessive in relation to its purposes. See id.
The court noted that New Jersey courts have a long history of
treating motor vehicle violations as quasi-criminal matters stemming
from statutes with penal intentions. See id. at 494, 724 A.2d at 250.
As such, the court noted that due process protections and notions of
fundamental fairness apply to protect the rights of defendants facing
proceedings under these statutes. See id., 724 A.2d at 251. Accordingly, Justice Stein found that the state's motor vehicles laws generally fall within the class of laws the enforcement of which implicate
double jeopardy concerns. See id. at 494-95, 724 A.2d at 251. In analyzing the breathalyzer refusal statute in particular, the court noted
that the Legislature has classified punishment under the statute as
civil in nature since adjudication requires only a preponderance of
the evidence standard rather than the beyond a reasonable doubt
standard required in criminal prosecutions. See id. at 495, 724 A.2d
at 251. The court pointed out, however, that the evidentiary standard for the refusal statute was altered by amendment from its originally codified standard requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
See id. at 496, 724 A.2d at 251-52. The court also noted that the punishments applied for a violation of the breathalyzer refusal statute are
severe and are similar to the punishments for the DWI offense itself.
See id., 724 A.2d at 252.
Noting that DWI offenses are, without contest, treated as criminal offenses for double jeopardy purposes, and relying on the harsh
consequences of violating the statute, the court determined that a refusal under the Implied Consent Statute likewise implicated double
jeopardy concerns as a criminal sanction. See id. at 499, 724 A.2d at
253. Relying on two of the Hudson criteria rather than determining
the applicability of all seven, the court noted that the statute's punishment served the deterrent and retributive purposes traditionally
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associated with punitive sanctions and that the sanctions at their
strongest "significantly exceed[ ] the remedial purposes assigned to it
by the State." Id. Accordingly, the court concluded that the breathalyzer refusal statute must be deemed quasi-criminal in nature for
double jeopardy purposes such that an acquittal under the statute
may not constitutionally be appealed by the state. See id. at 500, 724
A.2d at 253.
The court adopted a strong standard requiring unequivocal assent to the breathalyzer testing statute and determined that Widmaier's responses were sufficiently equivocal to constitute a refusal in
violation of the statute. See id. at 500-01, 724 A.2d at 254. The court
nevertheless affirmed Widmaier's acquittal on the refusal charge
since it found that the state's challenge was barred by New Jersey and
United States constitutional double jeopardy principles. See id. The
court found that the lower court's acquittal represented a factual
resolution of the charge in the defendant's favor such that the double jeopardy doctrine barred the State's appeal as an effort to place
the defendant in jeopardy a second time for the same offense. See id.
The court's opinion in Widmaier promulgated a strict rule requiring complete, unequivocal, and unconditional assent by DWI
suspects to a police officer's request to submit to a breathalyzer test.
In so doing, the court is undeniably furthering the clear legislative
intent and public policy rationales underlying the state's DWI and
breathalyzer refusal laws. Strong guidelines such as these from the
state's highest court will likely strengthen the ability of police to enforce the state's DWI laws and to curb drunk driving on our state's
roads, thus underscoring the public policy concerns that gave birth
to the refusal and DWI statutes.
But while the court's opinion seems to produce a clear standard
and to delineate an unequivocal level of assent required by drivers on
the state's roads, the rule promulgated may ultimately prove unworkable in many situations because of the very nature of drunk driving
offenses and inebriated offenders. A refusal in the context of a
drunk driving arrest raises a broad range of potential factual variables
and unique questions of the suspect's comprehension of the law and
her ability to apprehend the consequences of her violation thereof.
If a DWI suspect is too drunk to understand the officer's questions for example, if she passes out when she is asked if she consents to taking the breathalyzer test, or if she bursts into a chorus of "Mary Had a
Little Lamb" rather than manifesting coherent and whole-hearted assent - can she realistically be deemed to have understood the law, to
have knowingly refused to submit to the breathalyzer test, and to have
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comprehended the consequences of her refusal? The court's standard - that anything less than unequivocal assent is a refusal - has
the potential for absurd results in the unique factual context of inebriated suspects and drunk driving arrests and may result in intentionally comical manipulation of the rule by clever offenders who are
smart enough, or drunk enough, to produce answers that no trial
judge could conceivably deem a manifestation of an informed refusal.
Among the many double jeopardy factors that the court raised
but did not apply in Widmaier is to ask if the violation at issue on appeal involves scienter, because a crime requiring scienter is more
likely to fit the definition of a criminal offense rather than a civil offense and, hence, is not appealable by the state when a defendant is
acquitted. See id. at 499, 724 A.2d at 253. The court focused on just
two of the seven Hudson factors - the punitive nature of the penalties that emanate from a violation of the refusal statute and the fact
that the penalties seem to exceed the deterrent and rehabilitative
purposes of the law. See id. Had the court inquired into the scienter
factor of the Hudson test, it may have had to acknowledge that a violation of the refusal law requires at least some minimal level of scienter, some basic comprehension by the suspect of the law, and the implications of a violation.
The court seemed to recognize that a suspect's comprehension
of the refusal law and the repercussions of a refusal are vital elements
of a conviction under the statute. If not, why would the court have
taken pains to prod the DMV to revise its breathalyzer refusal instructions in such a way that they will assure a greater level of comprehension by suspects asked to submit to breathalyzer tests? This demonstration of protective concern for suspects by the court betrays a
sense that, despite its adoption of a no-excuses, deemed refusal standard under which a suspect's own subjective impressions are allegedly immaterial, the court nevertheless wants to assure that suspects
really do understand the law and the consequences of a refusal. This
desire for enhanced instructions for suspects speaks to some basic
scienter requirement under the refusal statutes and belies the court's
assertion that the suspect's knowledge of the law and the repercussions of his actions are immaterial.
There is a secondary reason to question the wisdom of the
court's advice to the DMV that it should strengthen the explanations
it offers to drunk driving suspects asked to submit to a breathalyzer
test in that the court's recommendation raises separation of powers
concerns. Given that the court seemed assured that Widmaier un-
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derstood the law and knowingly violated the refusal statute, the suggestion that the DMV tighten its instructions forms no essential part
of the court's decision. See id. at 499, 724 A.2d at 253. Indeed, there
was no need for the court even to consider the efficacy of the instructions if it was convinced that Widmaier understood the law and knowingly violated it. Accordingly, the court's recommendation regarding
the DMV's refusal instructions reads as an advisory opinion from the
judiciary to an independent coordinate branch of the government.
Such an advisory ruling from the bench is constitutionally suspect
under concepts of divided duties and responsibilities and is wholly
unwarranted in the case under review.
The fact that the court skipped over the scienter element of the
Hudson test also underscores the internal inconsistency of the court's
opinion. On the one hand, if the refusal statute does not require a
scienter element to constitute a violation of the offense, then perhaps
the offense is civil in nature rather than criminal and, thus, an acquittal under the statute is freely appealable by the state. On the other
hand, if an acquittal under the refusal statute is a quasi-criminal decision that may not be appealed by the state under double jeopardy
principles, and quasi-criminal offenses that implicate double jeopardy principles normally require a scienter element as the Hudson
test indicates, then the court's deemed refusal rule cannot stand. A
refusal would require at least some minimal level of scienter on behalf of the defendant. The court's reasoning on the two issues in
Widmaieris internally inconsistent.
Beyond the contradictory analysis applied by the court, the Wdmaier decision may actually have the result of working against the
state's legislative and public policy interests in curtailing drunk driving through enforcement of the refusal statute. A drunk driving suspect faced with the cumulative punishments of both the DWI and refusal statutes may elect to follow Widmaier's lead by refusing to take
the breathalyzer test and gambling on a trial. If the trial courtjudge
determines that the defendant's response when asked to submit to
the test - passing out or singing a chorus of "Mary Had a Little
Lamb," for instance - does not demonstrate an understanding of
the refusal law and its consequences, or does not manifest a refusal
by the defendant, then the defendant will, like Widmaier, earn an
appeal-proof acquittal on the refusal charge. Without the breathalyzer evidence to back up the police officer's charges, there may even
be a chance that the defendant will walk scot-free at trial on the DWI
charge as well. For a clever or sufficiently inebriated defendant, the
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supreme court's ruling may provide an appeal-proof tactic to avoid
the harsh penalties of the state's DWI and refusal statutes.
The court would have better served the public interests in curtailing drunk driving and promoting more responsible operation of
motor vehicles had it recognized the fact that prosecution under the
refusal statute requires a demonstration of some level of understanding of the law and intent to violate it by the defendant. By its common-sense definition, a refusal is an affirmative act and one that cannot rightfully be "deemed" to have occurred from an equivocal act or
a conditional assent. Requiring some level of scienter would treat a
violation of the refusal statute for what it truly is: a criminal offense
that cannot be appealed by the state upon an acquittal.
Because of the harsh penalties assessed under the state's refusal
statute, the court could not bring itself to deem the statute merely a
civil law imposing only civil punishments and, thus, fully appealable
by the state in the event of an acquittal. Nevertheless, in acknowledging that the statute counts as a quasi-criminal law for double jeopardy
purposes, the court undermined its own determination that no level
of scienter is required to constitute a refusal. Inspired, no doubt, by
the noble goal of trying to combat drunk driving and eliminate the
excuses proffered by suspects seeking to delay taking the breathalyzer
test, the court removed a requirement of any level of scienter from
the refusal statute such that anything less than an enthusiastic, unconditional, and unequivocal assent to the breathalyzer test is
deemed to be a refusal under the statute. Such a finding is analytically at odds with the court's double jeopardy reasoning.
The court tried to have it both ways by declaring the statute to
be like a civil rule in that no scienter is required to constitute a violation, but recognizing that it is like a criminal statute in that its penalties are so harsh that an appeal of an acquittal would violate double
jeopardy. The court may have served its goal of tightening enforcement of the refusal statute by adopting the strict deemed refusal rule,
but its double jeopardy analysis unwound the very logic that produced that rule.
James C. Shel

CAPITAL PUNISHMENT -

PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW

-

THE NEW

JERSEY SUPREME COURT WILL NOT APPLY A STATUTORY AMENDMENT
LIMITING THE SCOPE OF PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW; FURTHER, THE
REVIEW OF DONALD LOFrIN's SENTENCE DOES NOT DEMONSTRATE
THAT RACE OPERATES AS AN IMPERMISSIBLE FACTOR IN THE
IMPOSITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY - State v. Loftin, 157 N.J. 253,

724 A.2d 129 (1999).
The New Jersey Supreme Court conducts proportionality review
to assure that the imposition of the death penalty in a particular case
is consistent with the penalty imposed in similar cases. See State v.
Loftin, 157 N.J. 253, 275, 724 A.2d 129, 140 (1999). The court also
uses proportionality review to determine whether impermissible factors, such as race, have been used in imposing the death penalty. In
making its proportionality determination, the court has historically
compared each defendant to all previous death-eligible defendants.
See id. at 276-77, 724 A.2d at 140-41. The Legislature amended the
death penalty statute, however, effective May 12, 1992, restricting
proportionality review to comparison with those defendants who had
actually been sentenced to death. See id. at 274-75, 724 A.2d at 139.
On May 5, 1992, Gary Marsh was shot and killed with a .38 caliber hand-gun during the robbery of a Lawrenceville, New Jersey, gas
station at which he was working. See id. at 317, 724 A.2d at 161.
Among the items stolen from Marsh were his identification, credit
cards, and ninety dollars from the station's register, including a fifty
dollar bill. Four days later, police arrested Donald Loftin, a twentysix-year-old black Pennsylvania resident, when he attempted to buy a
computer with Marsh's credit card. See id. at 318, 724 A.2d at 161.
During a search incident to the arrest, the police discovered, in
Loftin's possession, a fifty dollar bill, Marsh's identification, and a receipt for a .38 caliber hand-gun. A search of Loftin's car revealed a
plastic mask and the murder weapon. Subsequent to his arrest,
Marsh was implicated in a second murder, for which he was convicted on September 22, 1993. See id. at 320, 724 A.2d at 162.
On July 8, 1994, a guilt-phase jury found that Loftin had intended to kill Marsh. See id. at 318, 724 A.2d at 161. The penaltyphase jury found three statutory aggravating factors: (1) Loftin had
committed a prior murder; (2) Loftin had attempted to escape detec1698
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tion by wearing a mask, traveling from Pennsylvania to commit the
robbery, and killing Marsh to avoid identification; and (3) Loftin had
murdered Marsh during the commission of a felony. See id. at 320,
724 A.2d at 162 (citing NJ. Stat. Ann. § 2C:11-3c(4) (a), (f), and (g)).
Balanced against these aggravating factors, individual jurors also
found certain mitigating factors. See id. at 320-21, 724 A.2d at 162-63.
The jurors discovered that Loftin's father had left the family when
Loftin was five years old. See id. at 318, 724 A.2d at 161. Further, the
jurors found that at the age of six, Loftin had burned down his family's home when he set fire to his mattress. Finally, the jurors uncovered that Loftin had married at a young age and had joined the Navy,
but he was discharged when his wife attempted suicide. See id. at 31819, 724 A.2d at 162. The penalty-phase jury unanimously found that
the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors and, therefore, sentenced Loftin to death on December 6, 1994. See id. at 321,
724 A.2d at 163. The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed Loftin's
conviction and death sentence on appeal. See id The court granted
Loftin's request for proportionality review of his sentence and directed the Administrative Office of the Court (AOC) to prepare a statistical study and report of Loftin's sentence in anticipation of that
review. See id.
Chief Justice Poritz, writing for the majority, held that the court
would not apply the 1992 amendment to the death penalty statute,
which limited the scope of proportionality review, until the court had
an opportunity to review the findings of a Special Master. See id. at
346, 724 A.2d at 176. Moreover, the court held that Loftin's death
sentence was not disproportionate and that the defendant had failed
to show that race was an impermissible factor leading to the imposition of his sentence. See id.
The court began its analysis by addressing the 1992 amendment
to the death penalty statute, which purported to limit the scope of
the court's proportionality review. See id. at 263, 724 A.2d at 134.
The court implied that the Legislature had exceeded its authority by
passing the amendment. See id. The court then underscored that it
must ultimately determine the requirements for meaningful appellate review. See id.
The court then described the process of proportionality review.
See id. The chiefjustice explained that proportionality review consists
of two parts: (1) a statistical review, known as frequency analysis; and
(2) a case by case review, known as precedent-seeking review. See id.
at 265, 724 A.2d at 135. The majority stated that both types of review
compare the defendant's case to cases with similar fact patterns or to
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defendants with similar levels of culpability. See id. at 288, 724 A.2d at
146. Using the comparison group, the court instructed, the court
would determine if the defendant's sentence was disproportionate to
the sentence imposed in like situations. See id. at 275, 724 A.2d at
140.
Chief Justice Poritz acknowledged criticism of the court's frequency analysis methodology. See id. at 291, 724 A.2d at 148. Permeating each of the court's frequency analysis methods, the justice remarked, was the problem that the number of comparison cases was
so small as to make statistical models unreliable. See id. at 291, 724
A.2d at 148. Moreover, the justice suggested, many of the variables
used in the models were inherently subjective, such as the AOC's determination of whether a prosecutor could have sought the death
penalty in a particular case. See id. at 289-90, 724 A.2d at 147. Most
troublesome, the court noted, was that when a defendant pleaded
guilty the AOC had to make factual determinations without the benefit of ajury's fact finding. See id. at 290, 724 A.2d at 147.
The court submitted that the 1992 amendment should not be
implemented until a Special Master had the opportunity to analyze
the impact that the amendment would have on the predictive value
of the court's statistical models. See id. at 317, 724 A.2d at 161. Pending the Special Master's formal report, the justice concluded, the
court would continue to conduct proportionality review based on the
death-eligible universe. See id. Nevertheless, the court abandoned
one aspect of the frequency analysis, the numerical-preponderanceof-aggravating-and-mitigating-factors test, which simply compared a
defendant's case to other cases with the same number of aggravating
and mitigating factors. See id. at 294-95, 317, 724 A.2d at 149-50, 161.
The chief justice stressed the court's constitutional duty to review capital cases, which the majority urged could not be encroached
upon by the Legislature. See id. at 284, 724 A.2dat 144-45. Nevertheless, the court expressed reluctance to invalidate a legislative act that
was not constitutionally repugnant. See id. at 285, 724 A.2d at 145.
Before ruling on the constitutionality of the amendment, therefore,
the majority reasoned that the court should determine whether the
amendment was inconsistent with the court's appellate responsibilities. See id. Most significant, the justice contended, would be the reduction in the comparison group for proportionality review purposes. See id. at 290, 724 A.2d at 147. Acknowledging that the court
lacked the expertise or facts to make a determination in this case,
Chief Justice Poritz appointed a Special Master to analyze the issue
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and recommend a course of action to the court. See id. at 290, 724
A.2d at 148.
The court disproved claims based on statistical models that race
was being used as an impermissible factor in imposing the death
penalty. See id. at 316, 724 A.2d at 160. Despite an AOC report suggesting a possible race effect, the court accepted the Special Master's
conclusion that the court was no closer than it had been to solid statistical evidence of such an effect. See id. at 307, 724 A.2d at 156. The
court emphasized the Special Master's remark that the statistical tools
had been developed to uncover a race effect in individual cases and
that they were ill-suited to determine systemic prejudice. See id. at
310-11, 724 A.2d at 158. The court also relied upon the Special Master's survey of fifty trial judges, assessing the culpability of deatheligible defendants, which controverted the AOC implications. See id.
at 308-10, 724 A.2d at 156-57. The justice repeated that the Special
Master should develop a methodology better suited to measure any
race effect. See id. at 315-16, 724 A.2d at 160.
Having resolved to apply its traditional proportionality review,
absent the numerical preponderance analysis it had abandoned, and
having found insufficient evidence of a systemic race effect, the court
turned to proportionality review of Loftin's case. See id. at 317, 724
A.2d at 161. The court noted that but for its determination to withhold ruling on the 1992 amendment, proportionality review would
have applied in Loftin's case because he brought his appeal after the
amendment's effective date. See id. at 274-75, 724 A.2d at 139. The
court prefaced its review by noting that proportionality merely
sought to ensure that a defendant's sentence was not an aberration,
therefore some statistical disparity should be expected. See id. at 322,
724 A.2d at 163. The court defined the universe for comparison as
the 369 death-eligible cases brought between 1983 and September 1,
1996. See id. at 323, 724 A.2d at 164. Having established the comparison group, the court explained that the group was subdivided
into subclasses according to blameworthiness, based on the defendants' aggravating factors. See id. at 325, 724 A.2d at 165. The court
stated that because Loftin had committed a prior murder, his case
was compared to all other death-eligible defendants who had committed prior murders - sixteen of the 369-defendant universe. See
id. at 326-37, 724 A.2d at 165-66.
Despite the small sample size, the court explained, prior murderers were among the most blameworthy defendants and were frequently sentenced to death. See id. at 329-30, 724 A.2d at 167. Therefore, the court noted, the analysis suggested that Loftin's sentence
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was not disproportionate. See id. At the second stage of frequency
analysis, the majority explained, the court compared Loftin's case to
those that were factually dissimilar, but in which the defendants were
similarly blameworthy. See id. at 330, 724 A.2d at 167. This analysis,
the court expounded, considered both statutory and non-statutory
factors. See id. The court commented that the AOC itself urged caution in relying on this analysis, because the small sample size and
large number of variables yielded relatively low confidence in the results. See id. at 330-31, 724 A.2d at 168. Indeed, finding that this test
indicated a low probability that Loftin would be sentenced to death,
the court dismissed these results due to the low confidence level. See
id. at 332, 724 A.2d at 168. The court noted, however, that when the
same analysis was performed using only statutory factors, the probability that Loftin would have been sentenced to death increased significantly. See id. at 332, 724 A.2d at 168-69. Frequency analysis, the
court concluded, did not suggest that Loftin's death sentence was
disproportional. See id. at 335, 724 A.2d at 170.
Precedent-seeking review, the court explained, was the next
stage in the proportionality review. See id. Here, the court instructed, the justices would consider how Loftin's culpability compared with other defendants sentenced to death. See id., 724 A.2d at
171. To determine Loftin's culpability, the chief justice related, required examination of his blameworthiness, the degree of victimization during the crime, and the defendant's character. See id. at 336,
724 A.2d at 171. The majority recounted the factors relevant to the
blameworthiness determination: (1) Loftin had planned the robbery, if not the murder of Marsh, as evidenced by the distance traveled to the gas station and the use of a gun and a mask; and (2)
Loftin had no justification for the crime and the victim did not appear to have struggled. See id. at 336-37, 724 A.2d at 171. Nonetheless, compared to other murder cases, the court contended, this
murder was not particularly brutal. See id. at 338, 724 A.2d at 172. As
to the character of the defendant, although two jurors had found
that he lived a crime-free existence for his first twenty-five years as a
mitigating factor, the justice opined, Loftin's status as a two-time
murderer weighed heavily against him. See id. The court noted that
despite Loftin's expression of remorse to the jury and a state psychologist, the jury had not found this sentiment to be sincere or
heartfelt. See id. at 339, 724 A.2d at 172.
The court concluded that after comparing Loftin's culpability to
that of the prior-murder group, Loftin did not demonstrate that his
sentence was disproportionate. See id. at 346, 724 A.2d at 176.
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Whereas most of these defendants had established a mental disease
or defect, Justice Poritz noted, Loftin had not. See id. at 340, 724
A.2d at 173. Loftin's evidence regarding the difficulty of his childhood, the justice remarked, was not as compelling as that offered by
other defendants in the comparison group. See id. Distinguishing
Loftin from those in the group who had been sentenced to life in
prison rather than death, the court noted that most of those defendants had confessed. See id. at 341, 724 A.2d at 173. The court concluded that Loftin had failed to distinguish himself from the deatheligible defendants who had been sentenced to death, and therefore
the majority affirmed his sentence of death. See id. at 346, 724 A.2d
at 176.
In dissent, Justice Handler criticized the majority's reasoning on
each of the essential issues. See id. at 373, 724 A.2d at 190-91
(Handler, J., dissenting). The justice insisted that the court should
invalidate the death sentence as violative of the New Jersey Constitution because statistical evidence amply demonstrated that race played
an impermissible role in capital sentencing decisions. See id. at 37475, 724 A.2d at 191-92 (Handler, J., dissenting). The justice remonstrated the majority for having neglected its duty to vindicate proportionality review's most significant role: uncovering racial discrimination in the sentencing process. See id. at 375, 724 A.2d at 192
(Handler, J., dissenting). Justice Handler disputed the majority's
reading of the Special Master's report, as well as the AOC report, and
insisted that these reports demonstrated a growing disparity in the
imposition of the death penalty based on race, as well as the existence of a racial effect in Loftin's sentence. See id. at 377-425, 724
A.2d at 193-217 (Handler,J., dissenting).
Turning to the court's precedent-seeking review of Loftin's case,
the justice questioned the majority's conclusion, finding instead that
Loftin's sentence was clearly disproportionate. See id. at 426-27, 724
A.2d at 217-18 (Handler,J., dissenting). Justice Handler rejected the
finding that Loftin had murdered to escape detection and reiterated
that Marsh's murder was not excessively violent. See id. at 428-29, 724
A.2d at 218-19 (Handler, J., dissenting). As to the defendant's character, the justice stressed Loftin's remorse and the possibility of rehabilitating him. See id. at 429, 724 A.2d at 219 (Handler, J., dissenting). Comparing Loftin's sentence to others in the death-eligible
group, the justice asserted that besides his status as a prior murderer,
Loftin was not death worthy. See id. at 438, 724 A.2d at 223 (Handler,
J., dissenting). Loftin's sentence, Justice Handler submitted, was disproportionate.
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Scrutinizing proportionality review in general, the justice declared that the process was inherently subjective, and that it inevitably
degenerates into "an inquisition of the defendant's idiosyncrasies."
Id. at 439, 724 A.2d at 224 (Handler, J., dissenting). Justice Handler
commented that the goal of uniform application of the death penalty
was fundamentally at odds with the court's process of closely examining and exaggerating the details of each defendant's case. See id. at
439-40, 724 A.2d at 224 (Handler, J., dissenting). The justice concluded that where each sentence was distinguishable, no sentence
could be aberrant, let alone disproportionate. See id. at 440, 724 A.2d
at 224 (Handler, J., dissenting). The justice charged that precedentseeking. review was no less arbitrary than frequency analysis and that
the court should abandon both until a more objective framework
could be devised. See id. at 441, 724 A.2d at 225 (Handler, J., dissenting).
Finally, Justice Handler chided the majority for not having
found the 1992 amendment to the death penalty statute facially unconstitutional. See id. The justice denounced the amendment as
abolishing proportionality review as a meaningful safeguard against
arbitrary imposition of the death penalty. See id. at 442, 724 A.2d at
225 (Handler, J., dissenting). By delaying a ruling on the amendment's constitutionality, the justice lamented, the court perpetuated
the confusion and uncertainty that surround imposition of the death
penalty. See id.
The court correctly refrained from applying the 1992 amendment to Loftin's proportionality review. The scope of proportionality
review clearly falls within the province of the judiciary's function as
final appellate authority. Moreover, reducing the universe available
for proportionality review would strip the process of its usefulness only by comparing those sentenced to death with those who were not
so sentenced, can the court properly reach an informed judgment on
proportionality. Although the court withheld a ruling as to the
amendment's constitutionality pending the Special Master's report,
the tenor of the court's opinion suggests that the court agreed with
Justice Handler on this point. Perhaps the majority took a different
view as to the appropriateness of building a strong record before declaring a statutory amendment unconstitutional
Surmising cause and effect from a statistical model is a suspect
undertaking, even with large sample sizes and objective variables.
Here, the majority and dissent are equally guilty of embracing those
models that support their conclusion, finding fault with those that do
not. It could take decades for the universe of death-eligible cases to
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grow large enough so that a statistical model could identify a race effect with sufficient confidence. It seems unlikely that the Special
Master will develop a means to overcome the inherent problems that
infect the court's frequency analysis. Prosecutors' charging decisions
and juries' findings regarding the presence or absence of aggravating
and mitigating factors may or may not be informed by latent or extant racial prejudice in a particular case. Where the underlying data
points are thus affected, a statistical model cannot hope to discern a
race effect. To discharge its duty as final appellate court properly,
the justices must not hide behind statistics. Rather, the justices
should bring their wisdom and experience to bear in searching
precedent-seeking review as a means to discover systemic prejudice.
If the court remains uncertain about whether race operates as an impermissible factor in the imposition of death sentences, however, the
justices should hold that the death penalty violates the New Jersey
Constitution.
John D. Tortorella

